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Biography	
 
Jules Henri Poincaré was born in 1854 in Nancy, France to mother Eugénie, who had 
interests in mathematics, and father Léon, who was a professor of medicine.  During 
his childhood he suffered from diphtheria, which left him with a temporary paralysis 
of the larynx and legs, during which time he invented a sign language to 
communicate. He went to school between 1862 and 1872 where he showed great 
aptitude for science and mathematics as well as philosophy. He studied mathematics 
at Ecole Polytecnique from 1873 to 1875 and continued his studies in engineering at 
the Mining School in Caen while also receiving a doctorate in mathematics from the 
University of Paris in 1879 for his work on partial differential equations. In 1886 he 
took the chair in mathematics in the Faculty of Science in Paris. 
 
His contribution to mathematics started during his graduate studies, with him quickly 
gaining an international reputation for his innovative work on complex function 
theory, complex differential equations, automorphic functions, real differential 
equations and a new way of thinking about celestial mechanics, creation of the subject 
of algebraic topology, algebraic geometry and Lie’s theorem of transformation 
groups. Beyond mathematics, he also gained an impressive reputation as a leading 
expert in electricity, magnetism and optics, and wrote seminal work on the special 
theory of relativity. He was actively engaged with the public as well as his scientific 
peers and was passionate about communicating scientific and philosophical ideas to 
the wider public.  
 
Science	and	convention	
 Poincaré’s work on non-Euclidean geometry invited the reconsideration of the status 
of geometry and his introduction to conventionalism, a thesis he is perhaps most 
known for in philosophy. His conventionalism, however, is a matter of much debate, 
and the arguments he mastered from 1902, when his Science and Hypothesis was 
published, until his later essays, significantly refine. Starting with his argument for the 
empirical equivalence of Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries, advanced in 
Science and Hypothesis, Poincaré argues that modifications in the physical laws can 
make it possible to describe our experience as taking place within a Euclidean or non-
Euclidean space. While at the time his contemporary Pierre Duhem was also 
developing his argument for the underdetermination of theory by evidence, in this 
chapter Poincaré shows how the problem of equivalent descriptions can take concrete 
place in practice, with geometry now being underdetermined by experience. This very 
fact led Poincaré to conclude that geometry cannot be empirical. But how does he 
arrive at the idea that geometry is conventional? Poincaré accepted much of 
Immanuel Kant’s epistemology, and his categorization of geometry as synthetic a 
priori knowledge. With the problem of geometric underdetermination, he arrives at 
the idea that geometry is not empirical, but he also rejects the idea that geometry can 
be synthetic a priori, since Euclidean geometry is not uniquely imposed upon us by 
reason. We can conceive of the negation of the fifth axiom of Euclidean geometry and 
have constructed consistent geometries based on its negation; these facts entail that 
geometry must have a different epistemic status. In light of this, since geometry no 
longer fits within the Kantian framework, Poincaré introduces the epistemic category 
of convention.  
 
In a later chapter of Science and Hypothesis Poincaré discusses the laws of motion in 
Newtonian mechanics, and deems them also to be conventional. This fact made many 
of his contemporaries, such as Abel Rey and Édouard le Roy, to deem his broader 
philosophical stance towards scientific theories as conventionalist, a thesis attributed 
to him by many contemporary scholars as well. But Poincaré certainly did not intend 
for his argument to be taken to apply to empirical science in general; rather it was 
more narrowly focused and sophisticated. His argument for the conventionality of 
Newton’s laws of motion was motivated by the fact that the truth of these laws could 
not be established either a priori or a posteriori. The important point he made is that 
these laws are conventional and serve to define the central concepts of Newtonian 
mechanics, opening the door to the much discussed account of constitutive principles 
in science later advocated by philosophers such as Hans Reichenbach, Arthur Pap and 
advanced in the contemporary literature by Michael Friedman and David Stump.  
 
In his second philosophical book, The Value of Science, published in 1905, Poincaré 
further develops his ideas on the status of arithmetic, geometry and experimental 
science, and defends scientific knowledge against the generalised conventionalism 
with which he was associated after the publication of Science and Hypothesis. The 
chapters 'Is Science Artificial' and 'Science and Reality' are particularly targeting the 
assumptions of his contemporaries, especially Édouard Le Roy, who interpreted his 
conventionalist arguments to generalise to science as a whole. Poincaré makes clear 
that he localises the conventionalist thesis to certain hypotheses only – geometry and 
Newtonian mechanics – rather than seeing conventionalism as a generalised stance 
towards scientific theories.  
 
Theory	transitions	
 
In 1900 Poincaré gave a public talk at the International Congress of Physics in Paris 
entitled ‘The Relation Between Experimental Physics and Mathematical Physics’, to 
appear later as the chapter ‘The Theories of Modern Physics’ in Science and 
Hypothesis. In this talk he argues against the widely debated pessimistic take on 
scientific progress, the argument from ‘the bankruptcy of science’. While 
acknowledging that much theoretical change indeed occurs in theory transitions, he 
motivates a more optimistic stance towards science by arguing that every theory 
contributes to scientific progress and not all of a past theory is lost when it is replaced 
by a new theory. Rather, some of the theoretical components, the ‘structure’ of the 
theory, is retained, while much of the speculative components of a theory are revised 
and lost. A famous example concerned the change from Fresnel to Maxwell that saw 
the mathematical structure of the theory carry over in the theory transition, but the 
same did not occur at the level of the unobservable entities, with the ether being 
abandoned. Poincaré’s argument has received much attention, with John Worrall 
(1989) interpreting it as a form of selective scientific realism, which he calls 
‘structural realism’.  
 
Poincaré was also interested in the philosophical debate on time measurement, 
stemming from practical work on determination of longitude and his and scientific 
interest in electromagnetic and optical phenomena. He introduced the idea of relative 
motion and the rejection of Newtonian absolute time by recognising that the 
measurement of duration or simultaneity involves the introduction of convention. 
Many have been fascinated about the relationship between Poincaré and Einstein and 
how much the special theory of relativity was conceived by the former. His 1906 
lectures On the Limits of the Law of Newton engages with the laws of relativity. While 
his discovery of the Lorentz group made the ether irrelevant, Poincaré’s search for 
dynamical solution to the observed Lorentz contractions and dilations prevented him 
from going as far as Einstein into the theory of relativity.  
 
The	atomic	hypothesis	
 
Perhaps one of the most surprising turns in Poincaré’s philosophy concerns his 
attitude towards the atomic hypothesis. His distrust towards atomism was originally 
due to scientific and philosophical objections. Poincaré classified the atomic 
hypothesis as ‘indifferent’, arguing that atomism can at best be admitted as a fictional 
device that aids our thinking, but cannot be construed as an empirical hypothesis and 
that we cannot infer the real existence of atoms. He also compared the atom to the 
ether, the existence of which he did not commit to and claimed it will be abandoned 
by future theories. Such scepticism towards the atomic hypothesis was not 
uncommon, with other contemporary scientists, such as Ernst Mach, Pierre Duhem 
and Wilhelm Ostwald dismissing the theory as a metaphysical speculation. Yet, in 
1912 Poincare delivered a lecture at the French Society of Physics, following Jean 
Perrin’s talk on Brownian motion, in which he accepted Perrin’s results and famously 
stated that the atom of the chemist had become reality, arguing that one could claim 
atoms have been made observable since they have been made countable. This turn in 
Poincaré’s thinking has caused a rather intense debate among his interpreters, with 
some claiming Poincaré became a scientific realist. The argument Poincaré advanced 
however, can be seen as more consistent with his previous commitments, by taking it 
as an argument for the acceptance of the atomic theory as a theory supported by the 
evidence. His original distinction between indifferent, conventional and empirical 
hypotheses gives us context to understand the level at which Poincaré changed his 
mind. Poincaré took the evidence provided by Perrin to shift the classification of the 
atomic hypothesis: he made it from metaphysical and indifferent, to empirical and 
testable, with its quantities now being empirically determinate. He also raises the 
question, just like Perrin did in his presentation, as to which ‘atom’ we are accepting: 
the metaphysical, physical or chemical? While admitting the empirical evidence that 
has become available in favour of the atomic hypothesis, Poincaré claims that this is 
certainly not the indivisible atom physicists have been aiming to find since antiquity 
and this new atom brings a whole lot of new problems and mysteries, echoing the 
pessimistic argument he had previously developed.  
 
Science	and	aesthetics	
 
Contemporary philosophers of science have recently become invested in studying the 
relationship between science and aesthetics. Similarities in the notion of 
representation in art and in science have given rise to fruitful discussions as to how 
theoretical constructs reflect or represent nature, and the notion of beauty in science 
and its role in practice has also motivated a lot of debates, as well as the notion of 
creativity and imagination in scientific discovery. While not always explicitly 
acknowledged in these debates, Poincaré certainly engaged with the notion of beauty 
in science, with the question of whether an aesthetically pleasing theory is more likely 
to be true, and tried to articulate his own theory of creativity in the context of 
mathematical discovery. In Science and Hypothesis Poincaré asks what role aesthetic 
values such as simplicity and unity play in science: are they guiding us to the 
employment of useful theories or are they guiding us to the truth? He offers an 
interesting account for aesthetic values, taking simplicity and scope or unity to be a 
guide in scientific theorising. Preference for a simple theory that accounts for the 
largest number of facts is a regulative ideal guiding the development and choice of 
theories. He is, however, careful to clarify the epistemic role of such values, claiming 
that we should not infer the simplicity or unity of the world from the simplicity and 
unity of our theories. Later in The Value of Science, Poincaré’s account receives 
further elaboration, showing the depth of his argument. Addressing now a different 
problem, that of accounting for the value of science, Poincaré claims that scientists 
are motivated to discover beauty in nature. This search for beauty, the simplicity and 
unity of nature, provides the value of science and motivates scientists. It is here that 
we can start to see a reductivist approach to beauty – in terms of simplicity and unity 
– and some Kantian threads in his account. Poincaré claims that it is us that impose 
beauty on the world, that our aesthetic requirements guide our investigations and our 
intellect works together with our aesthetic sensibility. Later in Science and Method he 
draws an analogy between the scientist and the artist, claiming that the scientist 
selects the facts that would best satisfy the requirement of the aesthetic as the painter 
chooses those features of a person that would make the portrait most lively. 
Poincaré’s account of beauty has only recently received a detailed analysis but his 
contribution to this topic in philosophy is unquestionable, offering insightful new 
ways to think about aesthetic judgement in science.  
 
Mathematics	and	creativity	 
 
Poincaré’s discoveries in mathematics certainly made him reflect on the nature of 
scientific discovery and creativity, leading him to develop an insightful account of 
creativity, showing again his innovative philosophical thinking. Creativity has been 
subject to substantial philosophical work. It is important because we attribute value to 
works of art and scientific discoveries and often we are interested not only in the 
properties that the work might possess, but also in the process by which it was 
brought about. We value originals, not forgeries. We care about credit attribution and 
the original discoveries, rather than replications. In his chapter ‘Mathematical 
Discovery’ from Science and Method, Poincaré takes creativity to be the 
identification of unsuspected relations among known facts. What is particularly 
fascinating is his exploration of the creative process, which he divides into four 
phases: preparation; incubation; insight; and revision. Preparation is the process 
during which the subject consciously studies the problem at hand. During incubation, 
the subject’s mind freely explores possibilities without being conscious about it; he 
calls it ‘the unconscious machine’, and comes up with ‘sudden illuminations’. Next, 
the mind explores the tenability of the ideas, followed by critical conscious reflection 
after the inspiration in order for the ideas to be evaluated and verified. This account 
critically differs from the standard inspirationalist, romantic, accounts of creativity, 
seeing creativity as an unconscious process (often attributed to divine inspiration). 
Poincaré offers a more complex understanding of creativity as a product of both 
conscious and unconscious processes and places the aesthetic sensibility at the centre 
of this process as it is the aesthetic sensibility that screens which solutions of the 
unconscious mind satisfy its aesthetic requirements. The aesthetic sensibility acts as a 
“delicate sieve” which selects the theories or proofs that best suit our aesthetic 
requirements.  
 
From conventionalism and structuralism, to creativity and beauty, Poincaré’s 
contribution to philosophy is immense, and his views, while having received 
systematic analysis and appreciation among the philosophers of today, will certainly 
continue to inspire and illuminate the next generations of thinkers.    
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